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Abstract
In this paper, we study the optimal mix of monetary and macroprudential
policies in an estimated two-country model of the euro area. The model
includes real, nominal and nancial frictions, and hence both monetary and
macroprudential policy can play a role. We nd that the introduction of a
macroprudential rule would help in reducing macroeconomic volatility,
improve welfare, and partially substitute for the lack of national monetary
policies. Macroprudential policy would always increase the welfare of savers,
but their e¤ects on borrowers depend on the shock that hits the economy. In
particular, macroprudential policy may entail welfare costs for borrowers
under technology shocks, by increasing the countercyclical behavior of lending
spreads.
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The recent nancial crisis, that started in the summer of 2007, lead to the worst
recession since World War II. Before the crisis, a combination of loose monetary and
regulatory policies encouraged excessive credit growth and a housing boom in many
countries. This turned out to be a problem when the world economy slowed down:
as Claessens, Kose and Terrones (2009), Crowe et al. (2011) and IMF (2012) show,
the combination of credit and housing boom episodes amplies the business cycle
and in particular, the bust side of the cycle (measured as the amplitude and duration
of recessions). Excessive leverage has complicated the recovery and the return to
pre-crisis growth rates in several advanced countries, in particular in the group of
peripheral European countries known as GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and
Spain). Developments in those countries since the launch of the European Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 shared many characteristics with the run-up to
other crises. Real exchange rate appreciation (which in the EMU took the form of
persistent ination di¤erentials), large capital inows mirrored by large current
account decits, and above-potential GDP growth rates fuelled by cheap credit as
well as asset price bubbles are the traditional symptoms of ensuing nancial,
banking and balance of payments crises in emerging and developed economies alike.1
In addition to all these overheating symptoms, the GIIPS countries faced prolonged
negative real interest rates, which magnied the boom side of the business cycle.
When the crisis hit, all problems came at once: a sudden stop of capital ows,
concerns about debt sustainability, low or negative real GDP growth, and increased
credit spreads that helped to amplify the bust side of the business cycle.
There is an increasing consensus that the best way to avoid a large recession in the
future is precisely to reduce the volatility of credit cycles and their e¤ects on the
broader macroeconomy.2 However, the search for the appropriate toolkit to deal
with nancial and housing cycles is still in its infancy. There is high uncertainty on
which measures can be more e¤ective at delivering results. Conventional monetary
policy is too blunt of an instrument to address imbalances within the nancial sector
or overheating in one sector of the economy (such as housing). There is a need to
further strengthen other instruments of economic policy in dealing with
sector-specic uctuations.3 In particular, a key question to be addressed is the role
of macroprudential regulation. Should it be used as a countercyclical policy tool,
leaning against the wind of large credit, asset and house price uctuations, or should
it take a more passive role and just aim at increasing the bu¤ers of the banking
1See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and IMF (2009).
2See Galati and Moessner (2013) and the references therein.
3See Blanchard, DellAriccia and Mauro (2010).
3system (provisions and capital requirements), thereby minimizing nancial sector
risk, as currently envisioned in Basel III?
Our paper contributes to this debate by studying the optimal policy mix needed
within a currency union, where country- and sector-specic boom and bust cycles
cannot be directly addressed with monetary policy. Specically, we focus on the case
of the EMU, where the European Central Bank (ECB) has the mandate of price
stability at the union-wide level. Before the crisis, the GIIPS countries were not able
to use monetary policy to cool down their economies and nancial systems, address
asset and house price bubbles or abnormal credit growth. Therefore, the use of other
policy instruments in a currency union can potentially help in stabilizing the
business and nancial cycle. We provide a quantitative study on how monetary and
macroprudential measures could interact in the euro area.
Early contributions to the debate on the role of macroprudential policies include
several quantitative studies conducted by the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS) on the costs and benets of adopting the new regulatory standards of Basel
III (see Angelini et al., 2011a; and MAG, 2010a,b), and in other policy institutions
(see Bean et al., 2010; and Roger and Vlcek, 2011). Other authors have also
suggested that the use of macroprudential tools could improve welfare by providing
instruments that target large uctuations in credit markets. In an international real
business cycle model with nancial frictions, Gruss and Sgherri (2009) study the role
of loan-to-value (LTV) limits in reducing credit cycle volatility in a small open
economy with borrowing constraints. Bianchi and Mendoza (2011) analyze the
e¤ectiveness of macroprudential taxes to avoid the externalities associated with
overborrowing. Borio and Shim (2008) point out the prerequisite of a sound
nancial system for an e¤ective monetary policy and, thus, the need to strengthen
the interaction of prudential and monetary policy.4
Our paper ts in the recent (and growing) literature that embeds nancial frictions
in a DSGE model and searches for optimal monetary and macroprudential policy
rules. Closest to our contribution are the papers by Brzoza-Brzezina, Kolasa and
Makarski (2013) and Rubio (2013), who also study the role of macroprudential
policies in a two-country currency area, but calibrate instead of estimate the model,
as we do in this paper. Beau, Clerc and Mojon (2012) and Angelini et al. (2011b)
analyze macroprudential policies in an estimated DSGE model of the euro area but
do not distinguish between di¤erent countries in the union. In these four cases, the
credit friction consists in a borrowing constraint à la Iacoviello (2005), and hence
there is no default. Lambertini, Mendicino and Punzi (2013) study the e¤ect of LTV
ratios on welfare in a calibrated closed economy model with housing and risky
4Bank of England (2009) lists several reasons, why the short-term interest rate may be ill-suited
and should be supported by other measures to combat nancial imbalances.
4mortgages, which is similar to our setup for the nancial friction. Other
contributions of DSGE models with a nancial accelerator include Unsal (2013) and
Medina and Roldós (2014), who study the role of macroprudential policy when a
small open emerging economy receives large capital inows. A common result in this
literature is that the optimal macroprudential policy is state-dependent, and,
therefore, simple operational rules that react to observable variables may lead to
policy mistakes. For instance, if the source of a credit boom is a productivity shock,
and the macroprudential authority reacts mechanically to a credit variable (rather
than to the e¤ects of the shock), then welfare might decrease.
In all these previous contributions, and in the present paper, macroprudential
policies aim at reducing the volatility e¤ects of a built-in nancial accelerator but do
not a¤ect the risk-taking behavior of agents. An important exception to the
literature is the paper by Collard et al. (2013), who include risky technologies in a
DSGE model, and study how macroprudential policies can reduce risk-taking
behavior. In Collard et al. (2013), rms can either use a riskless or a risky
technology to produce capital goods. The risky technology is socially ine¢ cient
because it delivers, in expected value, a lower return than the riskless technology.
However, limited liability and deposit insurance provides an incentive to "gamble"
and collect the prots when the risky technology delivers a high payo¤. In their
model, monetary policy can only a¤ect the quantity but not the composition of
credit. The optimal macroprudential policy sets the capital requirement to a
su¢ ciently high level, such that rms internalize the riskiness of their choices and
only adopt the riskless, socially optimal technology. Hence, the optimal capital asset
ratio moves with shocks that a¤ect risk in the economy (such as the return of the
risky technology), but it stays constant when shocks do not a¤ect risk (such as an
economy-wide productivity shock).
In this paper, we quantify the role of monetary and macroprudential policies in
stabilizing the business cycle in the euro area using an estimated Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium (DSGE) model. The model includes: (i) two countries (a core
and a periphery) which share the same currency and monetary policy; (ii) two
sectors (non-durables and durables, which can be thought of as housing); and (iii)
two types of agents (savers and borrowers) such that there is a credit market in each
country and across countries in the monetary union. The model also includes a
nancial accelerator mechanism on the household side, such that changes in the
balance sheet of borrowers due to house price uctuations a¤ect the spread between
lending and deposit rates. In addition, risk shocks in the housing sector a¤ect
conditions in the credit markets and in the broader macroeconomy. The model is
estimated using Bayesian methods and includes several nominal and real rigidities to
t the data, as in Smets and Wouters (2003) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
Basel III calls for regulators to step in when there is excessive credit growth in the
5economy.5 We want to study the pros and cons of reacting to credit indicators,
either by using monetary or macroprudential policies. Having obtained estimates for
the parameters of the model and for the exogenous shock processes, we proceed to
study di¤erent policy regimes. In all cases, we assume that the optimal policy aims
at maximizing the welfare of all households in the EMU by maximizing their utility
function, taking into account the population weights of each type of household in
each country. First, we derive the optimal monetary policy when the ECB optimizes
over the coe¢ cients of the Taylor rule that reacts to EMU-wide consumer price
index (CPI) ination and real output growth. We nd that the optimal Taylor rule
strongly reacts to deviations of CPI ination and output growth from their steady
state values, as is typical in the literature. Afterwards, we extend the monetary
policy rule to react to credit aggregates. We nd that the extended Taylor rule
improves welfare with respect to the original one, with borrowers being worse o¤
under some conditions.
Next, we introduce a macroprudential instrument that inuences credit market
conditions above and beyond current regulations. This instrument targets credit
spreads by a¤ecting the fraction of liabilities (deposits and bonds) that nancial
intermediaries can lend. Spreads can be increased by imposing e.g. additional
capital surcharges, liquidity ratios, loan-loss provisions, or reserve requirements,
whereas the direct provision of liquidity to the banking sector (either through
conventional or unconvential policies) can decrease spreads.6 This could be achieved
via measures such as widening of collateral standards, the Funding for Lending
Scheme launched by the Bank of England in 2012, or even liquidity provision to the
real economy as in Gertler and Karadi (2011). We nd that by introducing
macroprudential policies welfare further increases, but that there are winners and
losers of including these measures. As we discuss in Section 4, optimal monetary
and macroprudential policies are welfare improving under housing demand or risk
shocks: these measures reduce the volatility of real variables by o¤setting accelerator
e¤ects triggered by these shocks. However, when technology shocks hit the economy,
macroprudential policies have the opposite e¤ect and magnify the countercyclical
behavior of the lending-deposit spread. This imposes larger uctuations of
consumption, housing investment and hours worked for borrowers and, thus, reduces
their welfare. Therefore, identifying the source of the credit and house price boom is
crucial for the success of policy measures that react to nancial variables.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and
Section 3 discusses the data as well as the econometric methodology to estimate the
parameters of the model. In Section 4, we discuss the di¤erent exercises of optimal
5See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011).
6See Crowe et al. (2011) and Vandenbussche, Vogel and Detragiache (2012) for a discussion on
the e¤ects of di¤erent macroprudential measures.
6monetary and macroprudential policies, while we leave Section 5 for concluding
remarks.
2. The Model
The theoretical framework consists of a two-country, two-sector, two-agent general
equilibrium model of a single currency area. The two countries, home and foreign,
are of size n and 1  n. There are two types of goods, durables and non-durables,
that are produced under monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities. While
non-durables are traded across countries, durable goods are non-tradable. In each
country, there are two types of agents, savers (size  in each country) and borrowers
(1  ), who di¤er in their discount factor and habit formation parameter. Both
agents consume non-durable goods and purchase durable goods to increase their
housing stock. Borrowers are more impatient than savers and have preference for
early consumption, which creates the condition for credit to occur in equilibrium. In
addition, borrowers are hit by an idiosyncratic quality shock to their housing stock,
which a¤ects the value of collateral that they can use to borrow against.7 Hence, we
adapt the mechanism of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), henceforth BGG, to
the household side and to residential investment: shocks to the valuation of housing
a¤ect the balance sheet of borrowers, which in turn a¤ect the default rate on
mortgages and the lending-deposit spread.
There are two types of nancial intermediaries. Domestic nancial intermediaries
take deposits from savers, grant loans to borrowers, and issue bonds. International
nancial intermediaries trade these bonds across countries to channel funds from one
country to the other. Therefore, savings and (residential) investment need not to be
balanced at the country level period by period, since excess credit demand in one
region can be met by funding coming from elsewhere in the monetary union. In
compensation for this service, international nancial intermediaries charge a risk
premium which depends on the net foreign asset position of the country.
In what follows, we only present the home country block of the model, by describing
the domestic and international credit markets, households, and rms. Monetary
policy is conducted by a central bank that targets the union-wide CPI ination rate,
and also reacts to uctuations in the union-wide real GDP growth. As the foreign
country block is characterized by a similar structure regarding credit markets,
households and rms, we abstract from presenting it. Unless specied, all shocks
7We could also assume that savers are hit by a housing quality shock. Since they do not borrow
and use their housing stock as collateral, this quality shock would not have any macroeconomic
impact.
7follow zero-mean AR(1) processes in logs.
A. Credit Markets
We adapt the BGG nancial accelerator idea to the housing market, by introducing
default risk in the mortgage market, and a lending-deposit spread that depends on
housing market conditions. There are two main di¤erences with respect to the BGG
mechanism. First, there are no agency problems or asymmetric information in the
model, and borrowers will only default if they nd themselves underwater: that is,
when the value of their outstanding debt is higher than the value of the house they
own. Second, unlike the BGG setup, we assume that the one-period lending rate is
pre-determined and does not depend on the state of the economy, which seems to be
a more realistic assumption.8
A.1 Domestic Intermediaries and Macroprudential Policy
Domestic nancial intermediaries collect deposits from savers St, for which they pay
a deposit rate Rt, and extend loans to borrowers SBt for which they charge the
lending rate RLt . Credit granted to borrowers is backed by the value of the housing
stock that they own (PDt D
B
t ), where P
D
t is the nominal house price and D
B
t is the
housing stock owned by borrowers. We introduce risk in the credit and housing
markets by assuming that each borrower (indexed by j) is subject to an
idiosyncratic quality shock to the value of her housing stock, !jt , that is log-normally
distributed with CDF F (!). We choose the mean and standard deviation so that
E!t = 1 and, hence, there is idiosyncratic risk but not aggregate risk in the housing




; 2!;t), with !;t being the
standard deviation characterizing the quality shock. This standard deviation is
time-varying, and follows an AR(1) process in logs:
log(!;t) = (1  !) log(!) + ! log(!;t 1) + u!;t
with u!;t  N(0; u!).
The quality shock !jt can lead to mortgage defaults and a¤ects the spread between
lending and deposit rates. The realization of the shock is known at the end of the
period. High realizations of !jt 1 allow households to repay their loans in full, and
hence they repay the full amount of their outstanding loan RLt 1S
B
t 1. Realizations of
!jt 1 that are low enough make households default on their loans in period t. After
8A similar approach is taken by Suh (2012) and Zhang (2009).
8the household defaults on her loan, the bank calls a debt-collection agency that





t . After paying this amount, the household keeps her house.
These debt-collection agencies charge banks a fraction  of the value of the house.
The prots of these agencies are transferred to savers, who own them. The value of
the idiosyncratic shock is common knowledge, so households will only default when
they are underwater.9
When granting credit, nancial intermediaries do not know the threshold !t which
denes the cut-o¤ value of those households that default and those who do not. The










Intermediaries behave in a risk-neutral way and require the expected return from
granting one euro of credit to be equal to the funding rate of banks, which equals




















+ [1  F (!at ; !;t)]RLt

; (2)
with [1  F (!at ; !;t)] =
R1
!at
dF (!;!;t)d! being the expected probability that the
shock exceeds the ex-ante threshold !at and G (!
a
t ; !;t) =
R !at
0
!dF (!;!;t) being the
expected value of the shock conditional on the shock being less than !at . The
participation constraint (2) ensures that the opportunity costs Rt are equal to the
expected returns, which are given by the expected foreclosure settlement as percent
of outstanding credit (the rst term of the right hand side of equation 2) and the
expected repayment of households with higher housing values (the second term).
Due to the fees paid to debt-collection agencies to make defaulting households pay
their debts, nancial intermediaries only receive a fraction (1  ) of the mortgage
settlement.
We introduce the macroprudential instrument, denoted by t, that inuences credit
market conditions by a¤ecting the fraction of liabilities that banks can lend. We
discuss its properties in Section 2.D.3. The aggregate balance sheet of domestic
9Under this assumption, no fraction of the housing stock is destroyed during the foreclosure
process. If, as in BGG, a fraction of the collateral was lost during foreclosure, risk shocks might have
unrealistic expansionary e¤ects on housing and residential investment. See Forlati and Lambertini
(2010).




(St  Bt) = n (1  )SBt ; (3)
where Bt are claims on nancial intermediaries in the foreign country (as explained
below). Combined with the participation constraint equation (2), we obtain the







+ [1  F (!at ; !;t)]
9=; : (4)
According to equation (4), for a given demand of credit from borrowers, observed







, intermediaries passively set the lending rate RLt and
the expected (ex-ante) threshold !at so that equation (1) and the participation
constraint (2) are fullled. Unlike the original BGG set-up, the one-period lending
rate RLt is determined at time t, and does not depend on the state of the economy at
t+ 1. This means that the participation constraint of nancial intermediaries
delivers ex-ante zero prots. However, it is possible that, ex-post, they make prots
or losses. We assume that savers collect prots or recapitalize nancial
intermediaries as needed.
It is worth emphasizing that the participation constraint delivers a positive




t+1) and the spread between the funding
and the lending rate, due to the probability of default. Lets rst assume that
t =  = 1 in equation (4), so there is no macroprudential regulation and in case of
default, the nancial intermediary recovers nothing from the defaulted loan.
According to equation (1), the higher is the LTV ratio, the higher is the threshold
!at that leads to default. This shrinks the area of no-default [1  F (!at ; !;t)], and
therefore increases the spread between RLt and Rt. Similarly, an increase in the
standard deviation !;t increases the spread between the lending and the deposit
rates. When !;t rises, it leads to a mean-preserving spread for the distribution of
!jt : the tails of the distribution become fatter while the mean remains unchanged.
As a result, lower realizations of !jt are more likely so that more borrowers will
default on their loans. More generally, when the nancial intermediary is able to
recover a fraction (1  ) of the collateral value, it can be shown (using the
properties of the lognormal distribution when E!t = 1) that the denominator in the
spread equation (4) is always declining in !at ; and hence the spread is always an
increasing function of the LTV. Evidence for the euro area suggests that mortgage
spreads are an increasing function of the LTV ratio, as discussed in Sørensen and
Lichtenberger (2007) and ECB (2009).
Finally, we assume that the deposit rate in the home country equals the risk-free
10
rate set by the central bank. In the foreign country, domestic nancial
intermediaries behave the same way. In their case, they face a deposit rate Rt and a
lending rate RL

t , and the spread is determined in an analogous way to equation (2),
including a macroprudential instrument t . We explain below how the deposit rate
in the foreign country Rt is determined.
A.2 International Intermediaries
International nancial intermediaries buy and sell bonds issued by domestic
intermediaries in both countries. For instance, if the home country domestic
intermediaries have an excess Bt of loanable funds, they will sell them to the
international intermediaries, who will lend an amount Bt to foreign country
domestic intermediaries. International intermediaries apply the following formula to
the spread they charge between bonds in the home country (issued at an interest
rate Rt) and the foreign country (issued at Rt ):













The spread depends on the ratio of real net foreign assets Bt=PCt to steady state
non-durable GDP (Y C) in the home country (to be dened below). When home
country domestic intermediaries have an excess of funds that they wish to lend to
the foreign country domestic intermediaries, then Bt > 0: Hence, the foreign country
intermediaries will pay a higher interest rate Rt > Rt. The parameter B denotes the
risk premium elasticity and #t is a risk premium shock, which increases the wedge
between the domestic and the foreign deposit rates. International intermediaries are
owned by savers in each country, and optimality conditions will ensure that the net
foreign asset position of both countries is stationary.10 They always make positive
prots (Rt  Rt)Bt, which are equally split across savers of both countries.
10Hence, the assumption that international intermediaries trade uncontingent bonds amounts to
the same case as allowing savers to trade these bonds. Under market incompleteness, a risk premium
function of the type assumed in equation (5) is required for the existence of a well-dened steady



















where Cjt , D
j
t , and L
j
t represent the consumption of the ow of non-durable goods,
the stock of durable goods (housing) and the labor disutility of agent j. Following
Smets and Wouters (2003) as well as Iacoviello and Neri (2010) we assume external
habit persistence in non-durable consumption, with " measuring the inuence of
past aggregate non-durable consumption Ct 1. The utility function is hit by two
preference shocks, a¤ecting the marginal utility of either non-durable consumption
(Ct ) or housing (
D
t ). The parameter  stands for the discount factor of savers, 
measures the share of non-durable consumption in the utility function, and '
denotes the inverse elasticity of labor supply. Moreover, non-durable consumption is











C + (1  ) 1C  CjF;t C 1C  CC 1 ; (7)
with  2 [0; 1] denoting the fraction of domestically produced non-durables at home
and C governing the substitutability between domestic and foreign goods. Following
Iacoviello and Neri (2010), we introduce imperfect substitutability of labor supply













The labor disutility index consists of hours worked in the non-durable sector LC;jt
and durable sector LD;jt , with  denoting the share of employment in the
non-durable sector. Reallocating labor across sectors is costly, and is governed by
the parameter L.11 Wages are exible and set to equal the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and labor in each sector.









t  Rt 1Sjt 1 +WCt LC;jt +WDt LD;jt +jt ; (9)
11Note that when L = 0 the aggregator is linear in hours worked in each sector and there are no
costs of switching between sectors.
12
where PCt and P
D
t are the price indices of non-durable and durable goods,
respectively, which are dened below. Nominal wages paid in the two sectors are
denoted by WCt and W
D
t . Savers allocate their expenditures between non-durable
consumption Cjt and residential investment I
j
t . They have access to deposits in the
domestic nancial system Sjt , that pay the deposit interest rate Rt. In addition,
savers also receive prots jt from intermediate goods producers in the durable and
the non-durable sector, from domestic and international nancial intermediaries,
and from debt-collection agencies that charge fees to domestic nancial
intermediaries to make defaulting households pay their debts.
Purchases of durable goods, or residential investment Ijt are used to increase the
housing stock Djt with a lag, according to the following law of motion:








where  denotes the depreciation rate of the housing stock and z () an adjustment
cost function. Following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), z () is a
convex function, which in steady state meets the following criteria: z = z0 = 0 and
z00 > 0.12
B.2 Borrowers
Borrowers di¤er from savers along three main dimensions. First, their preferences
are di¤erent. The discount factor of borrowers is smaller than the respective factor
of savers (B < ), and we allow for di¤erent habit formation coe¢ cients "B.
Second, borrowers do not earn prots from intermediate goods producers, nancial
intermediaries, or debt-collection agencies. Finally, as discussed above, borrowers
are subject to a quality shock to the value of their housing stock !jt . Since borrowers
are more impatient, in equilibrium, savers are willing to accumulate assets as
deposits, and borrowers are willing to pledge their housing wealth as collateral to
gain access to loans. Analogously to savers, the utility function for each borrower














12This cost function allows us to replicate hump-shaped responses of residential investment to
shocks, and reduce residential investment volatility.
13
where all variables and parameters with the superscript B denote that they are
specic to borrowers. The indices of consumption and hours worked, and the law of
motion of the housing stock have the same functional form as in the case of savers
(equations 7, 8, and 10). The budget constraint for borrowers di¤ers among those
who default and those who repay their loans in full. Hence, aggregating borrowers















1  F  !pt 1; !;t 1RLt 1SBt 1 (12)
 SBt +WCt LC;Bt +WDt LD;Bt :
Borrowers consume non-durables CBt , invest in the housing stock I
B
t , and supply
labor to both sectors (LC;Bt and L
D;B
t ). Savers and borrowers are paid the same
wages WCt and W
D
t in both sectors. That is, hiring rms are not able to
discriminate types of labor depending on whether a household is a saver or a
borrower. Borrowers obtain loans SBt from nancial intermediaries at a lending rate
RLt . After aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks hit the economy, borrowers will default









Since investment increases the housing stock with a lag (equation 10), DBt is a
pre-determined variable. Because the lending rate is also pre-determined and is not
a function of the state of the economy, it is possible that !at and !
p
t di¤er. Note,
however, that when the loan is signed, !at = Et!
p
t . The term
1  F  !pt 1; !;t 1 = R1!pt 1 dF (!;!;t 1)d! denes the fraction of loans which are
repaid by the borrowers, because they were hit by a realization of the shock above












is the value of the housing stock on which borrowers have defaulted on and which is
paid to banks after a debt-collection agency intervenes.
C. Firms, Technology, and Nominal Rigidities
In each country, homogeneous nal non-durable and durable goods are produced
using a continuum of intermediate goods in each sector (indexed by h 2 [0; n] in the
home, and by f 2 [n; 1] in the foreign country). Intermediate goods in each sector
are imperfect substitutes of each other, and there is monopolistic competition as
well as staggered price setting à la Calvo (1983). Intermediate goods are not traded
across countries and are bought by domestic nal goods producers. In the nal goods
sector, non-durables are sold to domestic and foreign households.13 Durable goods
13Thus, for non-durable consumption we need to distinguish between the price level of domestically
produced non-durable goods PH;t, of non-durable goods produced abroad PF;t, and the consumer
14
are solely sold to domestic households, who use them to increase the housing stock.
Both nal goods sectors are perfectly competitive, operating under exible prices.
C.1 Final Goods Producers
Final goods producers in both sectors aggregate the intermediate goods they














; for k = fC;Dg (14)
where k represents the price elasticity of intermediate goods. Prot maximization
leads to the following demand function for individual intermediate goods:













Price levels for domestically produced non-durables (PHt ) and durable nal goods














1 D dh 11 D :
The price level for non-durables consumed in the home country (i.e. the CPI for the
home country) includes the price of domestically produced non-durables (PHt ), and






1 C + (1  )  P Ft 1 Ci 11 C : (16)
C.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
Intermediate goods are produced under monopolistic competition with producers
facing staggered price setting in the spirit of Calvo (1983), which implies that in
each period only a fraction 1  C (1  D) of intermediate goods producers in the
non-durable (durable) sector receive a signal to re-optimize their price. For the
remaining fraction C (D) we assume that their prices are partially indexed to
lagged sector-specic ination (with a coe¢ cient C , D in each sector). In both
price index PCt , which will be a combination of these two price levels.
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sectors, intermediate goods are produced solely with labor:










t (h) for all h 2 [0; n] (17)
The production functions include country- and sector-specic stationary technology
shocks ZCt and Z
D
t , each of which follows a zero mean AR(1)-process in logs. In
addition, we introduce a non-stationary union-wide technology shock, which follows
a unit root process:
log (At) = log (At 1) + "At :
This shock introduces non-stationarity to the model and constitutes a
model-consistent way of detrending the data by taking logs and rst di¤erences to
the real variables that inherit the random-walk behavior. In addition, it adds some
correlation of technology shocks across sectors and countries, which is helpful from
the empirical point of view because it allows to explain comovement of main real
variables. Since labor is the only production input, cost minimization implies that










Intermediate goods producers solve a standard Calvo model prot maximization
problem with indexation. As shown in appendix B, ination dynamics in each sector
depend on one expected lead and one lag of ination, and the sector-specic real
marginal cost.
D. Closing the Model
D.1 Market Clearing Conditions
For intermediate goods, supply equals demand. We write the market clearing
conditions in terms of aggregate quantities and, thus, multiply per-capita quantities
by population size of each country. In the non-durable sector, production is equal to
domestic demand by savers CH;t and borrowers CBH;t and exports (consisting of
demand by savers CH;t and borrowers C
B
H;t from the foreign country):
nY Ct = n

CH;t + (1  )CBH;t

+ (1  n) CH;t + (1  )CBH;t : (19)
Durable goods are only consumed by domestic households and production in this
sector is equal to residential investment for savers and borrowers:
nY Dt = n





In the labor market total hours worked has to be equal to the aggregate supply of
labor in each sector:Z n
0
Lkt (h)dh = 
Z n
0
Lk;jt dj + (1  )
Z n
0
Lk;B;jt dj; for k = C;D: (21)
Credit market clearing implies that for domestic credit and international bond
markets, the balance sheets of nancial intermediaries are satised. Besides equation
(3), this requires:
nBt + (1  n)Bt = 0: (22)
Finally, aggregating the resource constraints of borrowers and savers, and the
market clearing conditions for goods and nancial intermediaries, we obtain the law
of motion of bonds issued by the home-country international nancial
intermediaries. This can also be viewed as the evolution of net foreign assets (NFA)
of the home country:





CH;t + (1  )CB

H;t
  nPF;t CF;t + (1  )CBF;t	 ;
which is determined by the aggregate stock of last periods NFA times the interest
rate, plus net exports.
D.2 Monetary Policy and Interest Rates
Monetary policy is conducted at the currency union level by the central bank with
an interest rate rule that targets union-wide CPI ination and real output growth.
The central bank sets the deposit rate in the home country, and the other rates are
determined as described in the model. Let EMU be the steady state level of
union-wide CPI ination, R the steady state level of the interest rate and "mt an iid













y1 R RRt 1 exp("mt ): (24)
The euro area CPI (PEMUt ) and real GDP (Y
EMU
t ) are given by geometric averages









; and Y EMUt = (Yt)
n  Y t 1 n :






















Similar to Kannan, Rabanal, and Scott (2012) we introduce a macroprudential tool
that aims at a¤ecting the credit market conditions countercyclically. As shown in
equations (3) and (4), the macroprudential instrument t a¤ects the equilibrium in
the domestic credit market and a¤ects the lending-deposit spread in each country.
We interpret this macroprudential instrument as being deployed above and beyond
current rules, which are static to a large degree. Hence, when we estimate the
model, we set t to a constant value of one. When we conduct an optimal
macroprudential policy exercise in Section 4.B, we allow the instrument to be
changed in order to maximize the weighted utility of all the citizens in the monetary
union. A tightening of macroprudential policies will be reected in a higher t,
which will translate into a higher lending-deposit spread. Although we leave it
unspecied, this could be implemented via additional capital surcharges, liquidity
ratios, loan-loss provisions, or reserve requirements that reduce the amount of
loanable funds by nancial intermediaries. We assume that the instrument, in
principle, can behave symmetrically and it can go below one. In that case, the
central bank or any other regulatory agency would provide liquidity to the banking
sector to reduce the lending-deposit spread. This could be achieved via
(conventional or unconventional) measures like a widening of collateral standards,
the Funding for Lending Scheme launched by the Bank of England in 2012, or even
a direct provision of liquidity to the real economy as in Gertler and Karadi (2011).
In the welfare maximizing exercise, we specify the macroprudential instrument as
reacting to an indicator variable (t):
t = (t)




We study two main cases. In each country the macroprudential instrument reacts
to: (i) nominal credit growth, or (ii) the credit-to-GDP ratio. For both cases, the
parameters  and 

 are either allowed to be di¤erent, or are forced to be the same
in the monetary union. In all cases, the indicator reacts to deviations from steady
state values.
This concludes the explanation of the model. In Section 3, we conduct a Bayesian
estimation of the models parameters. In Section 4, we examine optimal monetary
and macroprudential policy rules by obtaining the optimal values of ; y;R; 
and  using the utility function of the four types of households in the monetary
union (patient and impatient, in the home and foreign countries).
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3. Parameter Estimates
We apply standard Bayesian methods to estimate the parameters of the model (see
An and Schorfheide, 2007). First, the equilibrium conditions of the model are
normalized such that all real variables become stationary. This is achieved by
dividing real variables in both countries by the level of non-stationary technology,
At. Second, the dynamics of the model are obtained by taking a log-linear
approximation of equilibrium conditions around the steady state with zero ination
and net foreign asset positions.14 Third, the solution of the model is expressed in
state-space form and the likelihood function of the model is computed using a
Kalman lter recursion. Then, we combine the prior distribution over the models
parameters with the likelihood function and apply the Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm to obtain the posterior distribution to the models parameters.15
A. Data
We distinguish between a core (home country) and a periphery (foreign country)
region of the euro area. Data for the core is obtained by aggregating data for France
and Germany, whereas the periphery is represented by the GIIPS countries (Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). We use quarterly data ranging from
1995q4-2011q4 and eleven macroeconomic time series.16 For both regions we use ve
observables: real private consumption spending, real residential investment, the
harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP), housing prices, and outstanding debt
for households. We also include the 3-month Euribor rate, which we use as
counterpart of the deposit rate in the core.17 The data is aggregated taking the
economic size of the countries into account (measured by GDP). All data is
seasonally adjusted in case this has not been done by the original source. We use
quarterly growth rates of all price and quantity data and we divide the interest rates
by 400 to obtain a quarterly and logged equivalent variable to the model. All data is
nally demeaned.
14Appendix B details the full set of normalized, linearized equilibrium conditions of the model.
15The estimation is done using Dynare 4.3.2. The posterior distributions are based on 250,000
draws of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
16Due to the short history of the EMU we face a short time series. We include the years 1995-1998
to increase the sample size. During those years most EMU countries were conducting monetary
policy in a coordinated way.
17See Appendix A for further details on the data set.
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B. Calibrated Parameters
Some parameters are calibrated because the set of observable variables that we use
does not provide information to estimate them (Table 1). We assume that the
discount factors are the same in both countries ( =  and B = B

). We set the
discount factor of savers to  = 0:99. The steady state LTV ratio, which also
determines the cut-o¤ point for defaulting on a loan, is set to ! = 0:7 and equally
across countries, according to euro area data such as Gerali et al. (2010). We set the
default rate on loans, F (:) to 2:5 percent.18 As a result, the steady state value of the
risk shock is ! = 0:1742: We set the housing agent fee to  = 0:2, which is a value
higher than that calibrated by Forlati and Lambertini (2010), but lower than the
recovery rates for loans estimated for the United States.19 Using these values, the
zero-prot condition for nancial intermediaries, and the consumption Euler
equation for borrowers, we obtain a discount factor of borrowers of B = 0:985. As
discussed in the previous section, we set the macroprudential instrument to  = 1 to
estimate the model.
The depreciation rate is assumed to be 5 percent (annual) and equal across countries
( =  = 0:0125). The degree of monopolistic competition in the goods markets 
is the same across sectors and countries, implying mark-ups of 10 percent. We set
the size of the core countries in the euro area to n = 0:6, based on GDP data. The
bilateral trade parameter 1   is calibrated based on the weighted average of total
imports to private consumption from periphery to core economies. The analogous
parameter for the periphery 1    is calculated in a similar way, but is rounded to
ensure that the trade balance and the net foreign asset position are zero in the
steady state. Finally, we assume that the size of the durable and non-durable sectors
is the same for the core and the periphery of the euro area ( = ). The
assumptions of symmetry and balanced trade makes it easier to compute a steady
state where all relative prices in all sectors are equal to one, and where all per capita
quantities are the same.
18It is di¢ cult to nd non-perfoming loans for household mortgages only. Therefore, we use non-
performing loans as percent of total loans for the euro area between 2000-2011 taken from the World
Bank World Development Indicators database (http://data.worldbank.org/topic/nancial-sector).
19See Mortgage Bankers Association (2008).
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Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
 Discount factor savers 0.99
! Loan-to-value ratio 0.7
F Default rate on loans 0.025
! Steady state risk 0.1742
 Proportion of housing value paid to debt-collection agency 0.2
B Discount factor borrowers 0.985
 Macroprudential instrument 1
 Depreciation rate 0.0125
 Elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods 10
n Size core economies 0.6
1   Fraction of imported goods from periphery to core economies 0.06
1    Fraction of imported goods from core to periphery economies 0.09
 Size of non-durable sector in GDP 0.94
C. Prior and Posterior Distributions
In Table 2 we present the prior distributions, the posterior mean and 90 percent
credible set of selected estimated parameters.20 To save space, we present the
estimated parameters of the shock processes in Appendix C. As we face the problem
of a short sample, in addition to calibrating some parameters, we restrict others to
be the same across countries. More specically, we only allow the parameters related
to nominal rigidities to di¤er across sectors and countries, in order to permit
quantitatively di¤erent transmission channels of monetary policy. On the other
hand, the parameters relating to preferences, adjustment costs, and the fraction of
savers are assumed to be the same in both countries. We assume that the AR(1)
coe¢ cients of the shocks are the same across countries, but we allow the standard
deviation of the shocks to di¤er across countries. Also, in order to better capture
the correlation of key macro variables across countries, we assume that the housing
demand shock and the TFP shock in non-durables has a common component across
countries. For instance, the housing demand shock follows:
















where the country-specic (";Dt and "
;D
t ) as well as common ("
;D;COM
t ) innovations
are Normal iid with mean zero.
20For each step of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, given a draw of the parameters that we wish
to estimate, we must solve for the steady state levels of consumption of durables and non-durables,
hours worked in each sector by each type of agent, and for each country. Then, these steady state
values are needed to obtain the log-linear dynamics to the system. Also, for every draw, we solve
for the weight of non-durables in the utility function in each country ( and ), which is not a free
parameter but rather a function of ; ; ; , B ; "; "B ; and '.
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First, we comment on the parameters that relate to preferences of borrowers and
savers. We opt for a prior distribution centered at 0:5 for the fraction of savers in
the economy. We set a highly informative prior by setting a small standard
deviation of 0:05. The posterior mean suggests a somewhat larger fraction (0:61) to
t the macro data.21 Interestingly, we nd that the habit formation coe¢ cient for
borrowers is smaller than the one of savers even though we set the same prior for
both coe¢ cients. These estimates suggest that above and beyond the e¤ect of the
nancial accelerator, consumption of savers is less volatile than consumption of
borrowers, who will react more to changes in their relevant (lending) interest rates.
We center the priors related to the elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign non-durables, the elasticity of labor supply and the coe¢ cient measuring
costly labor reallocation to parameters available in the literature (Smets and
Wouters, 2003; Iacoviello and Neri, 2010; and Adolfson et al., 2007). We nd a large
elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods (the posterior mean of 1:9
is higher than the prior mean of 1:5). Regarding the coe¢ cients that determine
labor supply, we nd that the posterior mean of the labor disutility coe¢ cient ' and
the degree of costly labor reallocation is about one third, which is similar to
Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
Table 2: Prior and Posterior Distributions
Prior Posterior
Parameters Mean SD Mean 90% C.S.
 Fraction of savers Beta 0.5 0.05 0.61 [0.53,0.68]
" Habit formation savers Beta 0.5 0.15 0.72 [0.65,0.80]
"B Habit formation borrowers Beta 0.5 0.15 0.46 [0.26,0.66]
' Labor disutility Gamma 1 0.5 0.37 [0.22,0.52]
C Elasticity of subst. between goods Gamma 1.5 0.5 1.90 [1.05,2.67]
L Labor reallocation costs Gamma 1 0.5 0.72 [0.51,0.93]
 Investment adjustment costs Gamma 2 1 1.75 [1.10,2.35]
 Taylor rule reaction to ination Normal 1.5 0.1 1.56 [1.41,1.71]
y Taylor rule reaction to real growth Gamma 0.2 0.05 0.20 [0.12,0.28]
r Interest rate smoothing Beta 0.66 0.15 0.80 [0.77,0.84]
B International risk premium Gamma 0.01 0.005 0.0043 [0.002,0.007]
C Calvo lottery, non-durables Beta 0.75 0.15 0.62 [0.56,0.69]
C Calvo lottery, non-durables Beta 0.75 0.15 0.72 [0.67,0.77]
D Calvo lottery, durables Beta 0.75 0.15 0.64 [0.57,0.72]
D Calvo lottery, durables Beta 0.75 0.15 0.59 [0.52,0.67]
C Indexation, non-durables Beta 0.33 0.15 0.15 [0.02,0.26]
C Indexation, non-durables Beta 0.33 0.15 0.13 [0.02,0.23]
D Indexation, durables Beta 0.33 0.15 0.25 [0.06,0.43]
D Indexation, durables Beta 0.33 0.15 0.43 [0.21,0.68]
21Gerali et al. (2010) calibrate this fraction to be 0:8 for the euro area.
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The coe¢ cients on the Taylor rule suggest a strong response to ination uctuations
in the euro area (coe¢ cient of 1:56, close to the prior mean), a moderate response to
real GDP growth (posterior mean of 0:2) and a high degree of interest rate inertia
(0:80). We opt for a gamma prior for the risk premia elasticity B between countries
with a mean of 0:01. We nd that the risk premium elasticity between countries
moves about 0:43 basis points with a one percent increase in the external
debt-to-GDP ratio.
Next, we comment on the coe¢ cients regarding nominal rigidities. We opt for Beta
prior distributions for Calvo probabilities with a mean of 0:75 (average duration of
price contracts of four quarters) and standard deviation of 0:15. We set the mean of
the prior distributions for all indexation parameters to 0:33. This set of priors is
consistent with the survey evidence on price-setting presented in Fabiani et al.
(2006). The posterior means for the Calvo lotteries are lower than the prior means,
and in all cases prices are reset roughly every three quarters. Overall, these
probabilities are lower than other studies of the euro area like Smets and Wouters
(2003). We also nd that price indexation is low in all prices and sectors. One
possible explanation is that we are using a shorter and more recent data set where
ination rates are less sticky than in the 1970s and 1980s.
Table C.1 in the appendix presents the prior and posterior distributions for the
shock processes. We comment on two results. First, the common innovations to
non-durable technology shocks and durable preference shocks are important, and as
we discuss in the next subsection they are key to match cross-country correlations of
some key macro variables. Second, the mean of the (log) risk shock is
log(0:1742) =  1:74. We set a prior standard deviation for the innovation to the
housing risk shock of 0.25 (that is, 25 percent), such that, roughly, the two-standard
deviation prior interval is between -1.25 and -2.25. Given the properties of the
log-normal distribution, this means that the default rate for mortgages ranges
between 0.04 and 13.6 percent with 95 percent probability. This seems to be an
acceptable range for euro area member states.22 The estimates for the quality shock
in the periphery are similar to the prior, while in the core there seems to be much
less risk volatility, as reected by the posterior.
D. Model Fit and Variance Decomposition
We present the standard deviation and rst ve autocorrelations of the observable
variables, and their counterpart in the model implied by the posterior distribution of
the parameters, to understand how well the model ts the data. In Table 3, the rst
22See the World Development Indicators database from the World Bank.
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row for each entry is the data, the second row is the 90 percent condent set implied
by the model estimates. The model does reasonably well in explaining the standard
deviation of all variables in the periphery. However, the model overpredicts the
volatility of prices and quantities in both sectors in the core of the euro area, despite
having allowed for di¤erent degrees of nominal rigidities, indexation, and di¤erent
standard deviations of shocks. Finally, the model correctly implies that credit
growth in the periphery is more volatile than in the core. The model also does a
better job in explaining the persistence of variables in the periphery than in the
core, and does a good job in predicting the persistence of interest rates. It slightly
overpredicts the persistence of CPI ination in the periphery, and slight
underpredicts the persistence of residential investment, consumption growth, and
house prices. In the core, the model has a harder time tting the lack of persistence
in CPI ination, residential investment and consumption growth.
Table 3: Posterior Second Moments in the Data and in the Model
Std. Dev. Autocorrelation
1 2 3 4 5
r 0.34 0.91 0.78 0.63 0.47 0.32
[0.22,0.31] [0.84,0,91] [0.65,0.80] [0.49,0.68] [0.35,0.57] [0.25,0.48]
pC 0.30 0.21 0.09 0.21 -0.15 -0.19
[0.35,0.47] [0.47,0.59] [0.14,0.29] [-0.01,0.14] [-0.06,0.06] [-0.08,0.04]
c 0.46 -0.13 0.12 0.12 -0.08 0.26
[0.64,0.82] [0.44,0.57] [0.13,0.29] [-0.01,0.13] [-0.08,0.03] [-0.10,-0.02]
yD 1.67 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.12 -0.03
[1.99,2.65] [0.45,0.63] [0.11,0.37] [-0.05,0.18] [-0.12,0.06] [-0.13,-0.01]
pD 0.70 0.56 0.54 0.41 0.30 0.11
[0.88,1.25] [0.54,0.70] [0.17,0.41] [-0.03,0.20] [-0.12,0.05] [-0.12,-0.01]
s 0.45 0.30 0.34 0.16 0.49 0.01
[0.82,1.03] [0.56,0.71] [0.44,0.61] [0.33,0.51] [0.24,0.43] [0.16,0.35]
pC

0.31 0.41 0.21 0.02 -0.28 -0.22
[0.34,0.45] [0.56, 0.67] [0.24,0.39] [0.05,0.25] [-0.03,0.11] [-0.07,0.04]
c 0.59 0.60 0.52 0.44 0.32 0.24
[0.55,0.71] [0.48, 0.60] [0.18,0.34] [0.03,0.18] [-0.05,0.08] [-0.09,0.02]
yD

2.22 0.62 0.55 0.58 0.50 0.48
[1.97,2.56] [0.38, 0.62] [0.05,0.33] [-0.08,0.15] [-0.11,0.04] [-0.12,-0.01]
pD

1.44 0.87 0.84 0.76 0.71 0.64
[0.99,1.31] [0.58, 0.73] [0.15,0.37] [-0.06,0.10] [-0.14,0.03] [-0.15,-0.07]
s 1.36 0.48 0.68 0.42 0.64 0.28
[1.19,1.55] [0.45, 0.61] [0.35,0.51] [0.25,0.43] [0.16,0.33] [0.09,0.25]
Note: For each variable, the top row denotes second moments in the data, and the bottom row
denotes posterior second moments in the estimated model (90 percent credible set). Standard
deviations for all variables are in percent terms.
The model captures most of the comovement between main aggregates within and
across countries of the euro area, which is especially important for the design of
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix






pD 0.30 0.34 1
[-0.01,0.18] [0.19,0.48] 1
s 0.20 0.21 0.35 1
[0.04,0.21] [0.26,0.43] [0.42,0.59] 1
c 0.31 0.15 0.28 0.64 1
[0.28,0.49] [0.12,0.26] [0.11,0.23] [0.08,0.18] 1
yD

0.37 0.27 0.37 0.48 0.65 1
[0.10,0.24] [0.12,0.33] [0.05,0.23] [0.05,0.16] [0.16, 0.33] 1
pD

0.17 0.03 0.36 0.27 0.54 0.62 1
[0.08,0.19] [0.06,0.23] [0.07,0.32] [0.07,0.20] [0.05,0.27] [0.22,0.50] 1
s 0.14 0.06 0.27 0.43 0.61 0.58 0.73
[0.04,0.11] [0.04,0.13] [0.10,0.18] [0.10,0.23] [-0.03,0.11] [0.23,0.34] [0.34,0.44]
Note: For each variable, the top row denotes the correlation in the data, and the bottom row
denotes the posterior correlation in the estimated model (90 percent credible set).
optimal monetary and macroprudential policies. In Table 4 we present the
contemporaneous correlation of selected observable variables in the data and in the
model (90 percent condence set).23 Among the successes, we note that the model
explains the correlation between house prices and residential investment within each
area well. The model also ts well the correlation of house price ination,
consumption growth and residential investment growth across countries. The model
can explain the comovement between consumption and residential investment in the
core, but fails at explaining the comovement in the periphery. Finally, the model
does a good job in explaining the correlation of credit with main macroeconomic
variables in the core. The model does a worse job in explaining the correlation of
credit with other macro aggregates in the periphery, because it implies a correlation
that is smaller than in the data, while still getting the sign right.
We briey discuss the results from the variance decomposition exercise. To save
space, we present the table with the 90 percent condence set for the share of the
variance of each variable explained by the two most important shocks in the
appendix (Table C.3). For all variables, two shocks are enough to explain at least
half of their variance, while the remaining shocks explain a small fraction of the
variance one at a time. In most cases, each variable in each country and sector is
mostly explained by technology and preference shocks in that country and sector.
For instance, residential investment and housing prices are mostly explained by a
combination of supply and demand shocks. There are no important spillovers from
shocks originating in one country or sector to another. There are two exceptions to
this pattern. CPI ination in both areas is explained by the common innovation
23Table C.2 in the appendix presents contemporaneous correlation of all observable variables.
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component to nondurable technology, and monetary shocks. The unit root shock to
aggregate technology explains an important fraction of volatility of consumption
growth in both areas. Finally, it is worth noting that in each country, the volatility
of credit is mostly explained by risk shocks and by housing demand (durable
preference) shocks. But risk shocks do not have an important impact on the
volatility of real macroeconomic variables.
E. Model Comparison: A Brief Discussion
The model we have presented up to now is the one that appears to explain the
observable data best. In this subsection, we briey discuss other model specications
that we have estimated. The full results including model comparison statistics such
as the marginal likelihood for each model, and posterior distributions for the models
parameters and second moments implied by each model are available upon request.
First, we discuss the main ndings of estimating a model with only savers by setting
 = 1. In this case, the model abstracts from nancial frictions and, thus, we also
dropped the risk shocks in the housing market. Furthermore, credit growth did not
enter the set of observable variables anymore, which complicated using the marginal
likelihood as a model comparison statistic. Omitting nancial frictions, we found
that most parameter estimates turn out to be very similar to what we reported in
Table 2, and the posterior second moments are also very similar to the model with
borrowers and savers. Hence, we nd that in order to t macroeconomic variables
such as CPI ination, house prices, consumption and residential investment, it is not
necessary to introduce nancial frictions in the model. However, the model we
present in this paper allows us to analyze the interaction between credit aggregates
and other macroeconomic variables.
Second, we also estimated our model without common innovations in nondurable
technology shocks and durable preference shocks across countries. In this case, the
model t to the data was worse when trying to explain the correlation of
consumption growth, residential investment growth and house prices across
countries. We also experimented with introducing common innovations to other
shocks in the model but we found that the estimates of the standard deviations were
quite small, and hence did not change the implications of the model for posterior
second moments.
Third, instead of assuming that the AR(1) coe¢ cients of the shocks are the same
across countries, we allowed them to be di¤erent. But this did not improve the
model t. In addition, following the results in Christiano, Motto and Rostagno
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(2013), we also introduced news shocks in the housing quality shocks as follows:




for s = 1 to 4. We found that the marginal likelihood favored the model without
news shocks and, therefore, we excluded them from the analysis. When we
performed a posterior variance decomposition exercise, we found that lagged
innovations to risk explained a fraction of the variance of credit, but they explained
a very small fraction (less than 1 percent) of the variance of observed real
macroeconomic variables.












instead of a Taylor-type rule as equation (24). We also estimated a version of the
model where funding costs for nancial intermediaries are the same across
countries.24 None of these two extensions improved model t so they were discarded.
4. Policy Experiments
This section discusses the optimal monetary and macroprudential policy mix for the
euro area. For this purpose, we analyze the performance of di¤erent policy rules
using the estimated parameter values and shock processes of the previous section.
We evaluate aggregate welfare by taking a second order approximation to the utility
function of each household and country, and to the equilibrium conditions of the
model, at the posterior mean of the models parameters. We assume that policy
makers maximize the welfare function of all citizens of the euro area (borrowers and
savers in the core and periphery) using their population weights. That is, we dene
the welfare function as:
WEMU = nW + (1  n)W (27)
with W = WS + (1  )WB and W = WS + (1  )WB ;
where WS is the welfare of core savers, which is evaluated by taking a second order
approximation to the utility function (6) and subtracting the value of the utility
24In this case, in order to achieve stationarity in the model, we assumed that there are complete
markets for securities traded internationally.
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function at the non-stochastic steady state.25 WB is the welfare of core borrowers,
which is evaluated similarly using their utility function (11). WS and WB are
dened analogously for the periphery households.
Basel III calls for regulators to intervene in case of excessive credit growth. We aim
at studying the pros and cons of reacting to credit indicators, either by using
monetary or macroprudential policies. First, we study optimal monetary policy rules
by optimizing over the coe¢ cients of the estimated Taylor rule. Second, we extend
the Taylor rule to react to di¤erent measures involving credit (nominal credit growth
and the credit-to-GDP ratio), and optimize over the additional coe¢ cient. Third,
we include a macroprudential rule that leans against the windof credit cycles. As
we discussed in Section 2.D.3, we assume that macroprudential policies a¤ect the
credit market clearing condition (3) by using the t instrument directly. To increase
lending spreads, di¤erent measures could be used, such as additional capital
surcharges, liquidity ratios, loan-loss provisions, or reserve requirements. We assume
that the steady-state value of  = 1, and that the instrument may also take values
smaller than one. In this latter case, commercial banks could lend beyond their
loanable funds (i.e. the deposit base and foreign bonds) by obtaining liquidity from
the central bank. As in the case of extended optimal monetary policy, the
macroprudential instrument reacts whenever these di¤erent measures involving
credit deviate from their steady state values. To obtain the optimal policy response
of the central bank using the nominal interest rate, we exclude the monetary policy
shock "mt in all of these simulations.
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A. Optimal Monetary Policy
A.1 Estimated Taylor Rule
We start by optimizing over the coe¢ cients of the estimated Taylor rule (27). In
particular, we optimize over the coe¢ cients of the reaction to area-wide CPI
ination, area-wide real GDP growth, and interest rate smoothing. We truncate the
coe¢ cients of the response to ination and output growth in the Taylor rule. As in
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), we nd that the welfare improvements are
numerically negligible when the coe¢ cients of the Taylor rule have reached a certain
25That is, WS = E [U(Ct;Dt;Lt)]   U( C; D; L), where E[] is the expectation operator, U is a
second order approximation to the utility function and C; D and L are the non-stochastic steady
state values.
26Including the monetary policy shock in our policy experiments primarilys a¤ect the results for
the inertia coe¢ cient. With iid monetary shocks as in the estimated model, the optimal degree of
inertia moves towards zero in most simulations.
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value but are left unbounded. In order to speed up the maximization routines, it is
thus helpful to restrict the coe¢ cients  and y to the interval [0; 5], while the
coe¢ cient on interest rate smoothing is restricted to the interval [0; 1].
In the rst row of Table 5, we show the optimized coe¢ cients of the estimated
Taylor rule. We also compute the improvement in welfare with respect to the
estimated Taylor rule in percentage terms. The optimal monetary policy suggests
stronger responses to euro area CPI ination and output growth than the estimated
coe¢ cients, and less interest-rate smoothing. In this case, the welfare of all
households in the euro area improves by 0.03 percent of steady state consumption,
but more so for savers in both countries. In fact, welfare for borrowers in the
periphery declines slightly.
Table 5: Optimal Taylor Rule Coe¢ cients
 y r s WS WB WS WB WEMU
Original 5.00 0.61 0.43 - 0.03 0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.03
w Nom. Cred. Gr. 5.00 0.00 0.65 1.31 0.06 -0.03 0.11 -0.08 0.04
1.56 0.20 0.80 0.46 0.03 -0.02 0.06 -0.06 0.02
w Credit/GDP 5.00 0.60 0.43 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.03
1.56 0.20 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: Parameter values in italics are not optimized over but calibrated at their estimated
posterior mean. Welfare results are presented in terms of percentage changes in steady state
consumption that would leave agents indi¤erent between the relevant rule and the estimated rule.
A.2 Extending the Taylor Rule with Financial Variables
Next, we examine the welfare improvement when the ECB is allowed to react to
credit indicators (nominal credit growth and the credit-to-GDP ratio in the euro
area). We either optimize over: (i) all the coe¢ cients of the Taylor rule, including
the coe¢ cient of the nancial variable, or (ii) only over the coe¢ cient of the
additional indicator, leaving the others at their estimated values. In all cases the
coe¢ cients are again truncated to a maximum value of 5. There is some welfare
improvement in reacting to nominal credit growth, but no welfare improvement in
reacting to the credit-to-GDP ratio. The optimal response to nominal credit growth
is s = 1:31. The same qualitative results hold when we keep the coe¢ cients of the
Taylor rule at their estimated values and only optimized over the additional
parameter.
Having monetary policy react to euro area nominal credit growth improves on EMU
welfare. Welfare of savers increases between 0.03 and 0.11 percent of lifetime
consumption, compared to the estimated Taylor rule. Yet, welfare of borrowers
declines in both areas. This captures an interesting aspect of our results. The
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heterogeneity in the model allows us to identify the winners and losers of di¤erent
policy regimes in the EMU. We will further examine this result below in the context
of impulse response functions, after discussing macroprudential regulation.
B. Macroprudential Regulation
In this subsection, we focus on macroprudential policies that are set countercyclically
to maximize EMU-welfare, but are implemented at the national level. Hence, we
analyze the optimal policy regime consisting of the estimated Taylor rule together
with national macroprudential rules (25) and optimize over the parameters of these
three rules in order to maximize the welfare criterion (27). In this scenario,
monetary policy reacts to union-wide developments, while macroprudential policy
responds to domestic developments in each country. The coe¢ cients of these policy
rules are jointly decided to maximize welfare at the aggregate (EMU) level. Since we
allow the macroprudential rule to a¤ect credit variables directly, we no longer
include the reaction to credit in the Taylor rule. Therefore, the macroprudential
instrument can be viewed as an alternative to having monetary policy react to
indicators beyond CPI ination and output growth. In this sense, we study the
Svensson (2012) suggestion that monetary policy should be in charge of price
stability while macroprudential policy should address nancial stability.
In Table 6 we consider the following combinations of cases: (i) macroprudential
regulation either reacts to nominal credit growth or the credit-to-GDP ratio, (ii) the
coe¢ cients of the Taylor rule are the estimated ones, or are optimized with the
parameters of the macroprudential rule, and (iii) the coe¢ cients of the
macroprudential policies are allowed to change across countries, or are restricted to
be the same.
Several interesting results arise from this exercise. First of all, in some cases there
are winners and losers of introducing macroprudential policies. The only policy that
improves welfare for each type of agent, yet it does not maximize EMU-wide welfare,
is to have macroprudential policy react to nominal credit growth. In this regime, all
households experience increases in welfare between 0.01 and 0.19 percent of lifetime
consumption. Furthermore, there are no big numerical di¤erences in welfare if we
impose the restriction that the coe¢ cients are the same across countries. Second,
the macrprudential policy that delivers the highest welfare (reacting to the
credit-to-GDP ratio) is highly divisive, since savers benet greatly from it, especially
in the periphery where they experience a welfare gain of 0.62 percent of lifetime
consumption, while borrowers witness an important decrease of welfare with respect
to the estimated rule (a decline of 0.73 percent of lifetime consumption in the
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Table 6: Optimal Monetary and Macroprudential Policy at the EMU Level
Using Optimized Taylor Rule
 y r  

 WS WB WS WB WEMU
Nom. Cred. Gr. 4.05 0.24 0.70 0.59 0.97 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.19 0.06
Restricted 3.96 0.24 0.69 0.79 - 0.01 0.10 0.07 0.14 0.06
Credit/GDP 5.00 0.84 0.62 1.97 4.63 0.12 -0.07 0.62 -0.73 0.12
Restricted 5.00 0.86 0.61 2.97 - 0.12 -0.08 0.62 -0.72 0.12
Using Estimated Taylor Rule
 y r  

 WS WB WS WB WEMU
Nom. Cred. Gr. 1.56 0.20 0.80 0.98 1.48 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.17 0.05
Restricted 1.56 0.20 0.80 1.26 - 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.17 0.05
Credit/GDP 1.56 0.20 0.80 0.59 1.20 0.06 -0.05 0.55 -0.71 0.09
Restricted 1.56 0.20 0.80 0.82 - 0.07 -0.07 0.53 -0.67 0.08
Note: Parameter values in italics are not optimized over but calibrated at their estimated
posterior mean. Welfare results are presented in terms of percentage changes in steady state
consumption that would leave agents indi¤erent between the relevant rule and the estimated rule.
periphery). These results hold when we use the estimated Taylor rule, and when we
optimize over the coe¢ cients of the Taylor rule.
Why is it the case that the welfare of borrowers declines under some optimal regimes
of monetary and macroprudential policy? We discuss several impulse responses to
understand under which conditions macroprudential policy improves welfare. In
Figures 1 and 2 we plot the impulse responses to a housing demand shock and a risk
shock in the periphery. We choose these shocks because the periphery of the euro
area experienced a larger boom-bust cycle in housing prices and credit than in the
core, especially in Spain and Ireland. After a housing demand shock (normalized
such that nominal house prices increase by 1 percent in the periphery), GDP, CPI
ination, house prices and credit-to-GDP increase in the periphery under the
estimated rule (Figure 1). In the core, GDP increases slightly, while all other
variables fall because the ECB tightens rates due to above-normal CPI ination and
growth in the periphery. But the spillover e¤ects tend to be quantitatively small. In
the periphery, both borrowers and savers increase residential investment demand,
and consumption behaves very di¤erently. Savers reduce their consumption
expenditures because they want to tilt spending towards housing, but borrowers
increase non-durable consumption because higher house prices and residential
investment improve their ability to borrow. This is the accelerator mechanism at
work.
The optimal monetary policy response leads to a decline in the response of all real
quantities in the core and a smaller response of CPI ination in the periphery, but
to a recession in the core. In this sense, the core is forced to pay for excesses
committed by the periphery. But even in this case, the stronger monetary policy
stance on CPI ination and growth does not contain accelerator e¤ects to really
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a¤ect credit-to-GDP ratio in the periphery. In order to achieve this, the use of
macroprudential measures is necessary: For this reason, we now add the
macroprudential rule that reacts to the credit-to-GDP ratio optimally (Table 6). As
a result, credit-to-GDP in the periphery increases to a lesser extent, there are less
accelerator e¤ects, and hence the stance of monetary policy can be softened in the
EMU as a whole (compared to the optimal monetary policy case). Overall, the
regime of optimal monetary plus macroprudential policy delivers more stability on
all real quantities in the periphery, and this improves welfare. However, this last
regime cannot fully o¤set the negative spillover e¤ects from the periphery to the
core borrowers. Similar qualitative results would hold if the housing boom was in
the core, but with core savers and borrowers benetting more from stability using
macroprudential policies.
A negative risk shock in the periphery has very similar e¤ects on most variables in
the periphery as the housing demand shock. When risk declines, the lending-deposit
spread falls in the periphery (the shock is normalized such that spreads decline by
25 basis points on an annualized basis), triggering an increase in the credit-to-GDP
ratio. Under the estimated rule, consumption and residential investment by
borrowers increase in the periphery, but that of savers decline. In the aggregate,
GDP increases in the periphery, and increased demand by borrowers also increases
GDP in the core, mostly through the net exports channel. However, higher ination
leads to an increase of interest rates that makes spending fall for both borrowers and
savers in the core. The optimal monetary policy tries to stabilize CPI ination by
increasing interest rates, which leads to reductions of spending for all other
households in the EMU, and a recession and deation in the core. As in the case of
the housing demand shock, optimal monetary policy cannot do much to o¤set the
accelerator e¤ects, while the use of macroprudential tools delivers overall stability
and takes the pressure o¤ the EMU-wide interest rate. If the risk shock had a¤ected
the core, it would have had a similar impact on core variables as the one described
here for periphery variables, and vice versa.
When does the use of macroprudential tools lead to inferior welfare outcomes,
specially for borrowers? In Figure 3 we plot the e¤ect of an innovation to the
EMU-wide (one standard deviation) permanent technology shock. In this case,
macroprudential policies increase the countercyclicality of the lending-deposit
premium, increasing the volatility of borrower-specic variables and reducing their
welfare. When a permanent technology hits the economy, this increases the level of
real variables permanently (however, growth rates and transformed variables remain
stationary). Since this is a permanent shock and both economies are quite
symmetric, the e¤ects are similar in both areas of the EMU. Under the estimated
policy rule, consumption and residential investment by all agents moves smoothly to
the new level. CPI ination falls in both areas due to the decline in real marginal
costs, while (nominal and real) house prices increase. Interestingly, under the
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estimated rule, credit-to-GDP falls, even though both quantities (credit and GDP)
increase. The lending-deposit spread changes only slightly, reecting minimal
movements in the LTV ratios.
Optimal monetary policy aims at bringing CPI ination back to target so that the
ECB cuts nominal interest rates and CPI ination falls to a lesser extent. Moreover,
most real variables display less volatility and a faster transition to their new steady
state values. The macroprudential policy aims at addressing the decline of the
credit-to-GDP ratio by allowing banks to lend more. As a result, the credit-to-GDP
ratio falls by much less and the lending-deposit rate becomes more volatile. This
generates a higher countercyclical response of the lending rate, which nally
increases the volatility of consumption and residential investment by borrowers.
Because they have access to cheap credit, borrowers spend more and supply less
labor, making hours worked for borrowers also more volatile, which further adds to
their welfare cost. On the other hand, savers still face a smooth consumption and
investment plan. By picking up the labor slack left by borrowers their overall labor
supply is less volatile, contributing to their welfare increase.
Hence, in a model with a micro-founded behavior of the lending-deposit spread, and
the welfare function, we nd a similar result to Kannan et al. (2012), who uses
ad-hoc lending-deposit spreads and welfare functions. Macroprudential policies that
"lean against the wind" improve welfare when it is optimal to reduce the
countercyclical behavior of the spread, as is the case of housing demand or risk
shocks. However, under technology shocks, mechanical responses to the
credit-to-GDP ratio will actually increase the countercyclical behavior of the spread,
leading to an increased volatility of spending by borrowers, and hurting their
welfare, even when the impact on aggregate variables such as real GDP or CPI
ination is quantitatively very small.
We conduct an additional robustness result by looking at the optimal response of
monetary and macroprudential policies if the policy makers were able to identify the
source of the shock. To that end, we simulate the model with either technology
shocks only (including all sectors and countries and the unit root shock), preference
shocks only (including all countries and sectors), and nancial shocks only
(including the housing quality risk shock and the risk premium shock across
countries). The optimal responses are quite di¤erent when the monetary and
macroprudential authorities can identify the source of the shock (Table 7). A key
di¤erence, that we identied in the impulse response analysis, is that the optimal
monetary and macroprudential response to any credit aggregate becomes zero under
technology shocks. As we already saw from Figure 3, including macroprudential
policies when technology shocks are present reduced welfare of borrowers by
inducing too much volatility in the lending-deposit spread. However, when nancial
and demand shocks hit the economy, the optimal macroprudential responses calls for
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Table 7: Optimal Monetary and Macroprudential Policy, Conditional on Shocks




Monetary Policy 5.00 0.00 0.90 0.00 - -
Mon. and Macropru. Pol. 5.00 0.00 0.90 - 0.00 0.00
Credit/GDP Ratio
Optimal Monetary Policy 4.82 0.00 0.90 0.00 - -
Mon. and Macropru. Pol. 5.00 0.00 0.90 - 0.00 0.00




Monetary Policy 3.36 5.00 0.99 0.70 - -
Mon. and Macropru. Pol. 2.42 5.00 0.98 - 0.34 0.34
Credit/GDP Ratio
Optimal Monetary Policy 2.33 5.00 0.98 0.01 - -
Mon. and Macropru. Pol. 4.13 5.00 0.96 - 0.86 1.26




Monetary Policy 5.00 5.00 0.00 0.98 - -
Mon. and Macropru. Pol. 5.00 5.00 0.00 - 1.60 1.96
Credit/GDP Ratio
Optimal Monetary Policy 5.00 5.00 0.00 5.00 - -
Mon. and Macropru. Pol. 5.00 5.00 0.00 - 5.00 5.00
responding to credit aggregates to o¤set their e¤ects.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the optimal mix of monetary and macroprudential
policy rules in an estimated DSGE model of the euro area. We have found that in a
variety of scenarios and calibrations, the introduction of a macroprudential rule
would help in reducing macroeconomic volatility and hence in improving EMU-wide
welfare. At the same time, macroprudential policies lend a handto monetary
policy by reducing accelerator e¤ects and thus, requiring smaller responses of the
nominal interest. We have also shown that the e¤ects of macroprudential regulations
can a¤ect savers and borrowers di¤erently. The policy that improves welfare in the
EMU the most - which would have macroprudential policies respond to the
credit-to-GDP ratio - reduces the welfare of borrowers by inducing a too
countercyclical response of the lending-deposit spread. A welfare improvement for
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A Data and Sources
Since we distinguish between two regions of the euro area, data for the core is
obtained by aggregating data for France and Germany, while for the periphery data
for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain are combined. The aggregation is
done by computing weighted averages taking into account the relative economic size
of the countries (measured by nominal GDP). Some of the series start later than
1995q4 or end earlier than 2011q4. If this is the case, aggregation for these quarters
only takes into account available data, while weights are adjusted accordingly. All
data is seasonally adjusted in case this has not been done by the original source.
Finally, all data is demeaned.
Ination: Quarter on quarter log di¤erences in the Harmonized Index of Consumer
Prices (HICP), not seasonally adjusted by the source. Source: ECB.
Change in House Price Data: Quarter on quarter log di¤erences in real housing
prices. All data, except for Greece and Portugal, is provided by the OECD. Greek
and Portuguese data is provided by the BIS. All OECD data is seasonally adjusted
by the source, while BIS data is not. Portuguese data is only available on a monthly
basis and is transformed to a quarterly frequency by taking averages. Data for Italy
already ends in 2011q3.
Real Private Consumption: Final consumption of households and nonprot
institutions serving households (NPISH), seasonally adjusted by the source. Source:
Eurostat.
Real Residential Investment: Gross xed capital formation in construction work
for housing, seasonally adjusted by the source. Data for Ireland is only available on
an annual basis while data for Greece is only available from 2000 onwards on an
annual basis. Both data is interpolated to obtain quarterly values. Source: Eurostat.
ECB Interest Rate: 3-month Euribor, Source: ECB.
Household Outstanding Debt: Data seasonally adjusted by the source. Data for
Greece starts in 1997q4, for Ireland in 2002q1, and for Italy in 1997q1. Source:
Eurostat.
Nominal GDP for computing the weights used in the aggregation is taken from the
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IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS). This data is also used to calculate the
size of the core and periphery region. Furthermore, for the calibration we use import
data (Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics) and data on nominal household
consumption (Source: IFS) to compute the fraction of imported goods. The size of
the non-durable sector is calculated as a ratio of gross value added by the
construction sector to that of all branches (Source: Eurostat). The steady state
ratio of defaults is calculated using non-performing loans as percent of total loans
for the euro area between 2000-2011 (Source: World Bank World Development
Indicators Database).
B Linearized Conditions
In this section we present all log-linear conditions of the model. Upper case variables
denote steady state values, lower case variables denote log-linear deviations from
steady state values, and foreign variables are indicated with asterisks. Additionally,
we make use of the following denitions:





 ~wit denotes the deviation of the real wages (nominal wages W it divided by the
CPI index PCt , for i = fC;Dg) from their steady state values,
 ~SBt denotes real domestic debt expressed in terms of non-durable goods





 bt denotes the deviations of foreign assets as percent of steady state
non-durable output from its steady state value of zero (bt  BtPCt Y C ),
 ^!it and ^!;t denote the deviations from their steady state values for the
threshold !it and the variance !;t, respectively (for i = fa; pg),
 The terms of trade is given by Tt = PF;tPH;t ;










 Aggregate non-durable consumption is given by CTOTt = Ct + (1  )CBt .
In addition, since the model includes a unit root shock in technology, the following
variables in both countries inherit the same unit root behavior:
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 consumption of non-durables (by agent and aggregate, including domestically
produced and imported): Ct; CBt ; C
TOT
t , CH;t; CF;t,
 residential investment and the housing stock of both borrowers and savers: It,
IBt ; Dt; D
B
t ;
 real wages in both sectors: WCt , and WDt ;
 the production of durable and non-durable goods: Y Ct and Y Dt ; and real GDP
Yt;
 and real credit ~SBt .
Hence, we normalize all these real variables by the EMU-level of technology At. For
these variables, lower case variables denote deviations from steady state values of
normalized variables. That is, ct = log(Ct=At)  log(C=A) and so on. Foreign









ct   "(ct 1   "At )
1  " +  (it   it 1 + "
A
t ) = Et%t+1 +  (Etit+1   it); (B.1)
where  = z"(:) and %t is the normalized Lagrange multiplier associated with the
law of motion of the housing stock (10) for savers, and
[1  (1  )] (Dt   dt) = %t   (1  )Et%t+1; (B.2)
"(ct + "
A
t ) = Etct+1   (1  ")(rt + EtCt+1   EtpCt+1): (B.3)
The labor supply schemes to the non-durable and durable sectors are:
[('  L)+ L] lCt + ('  L)(1  )lDt = ~wCt + Ct  
ct   "(ct 1   "At )
1  " ; (B.4)
[('  L)(1  ) + L] lDt + ('  L)lCt = ~wDt + Ct  
ct   "(ct 1   "At )
1  " : (B.5)
27Since all households behave the same way, we henceforth drop the j superscript.
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cBt   "B(cBt 1   "At )
1  "B + (i
B
t   iBt 1+ "At ) = Et%Bt+1+B (EtiBt+1  iBt ); (B.6)
with %Bt being the Lagrange multiplier associated with the law of motion of the
housing stock (10) for borrowers, and















 (1  "B)BRL [1  F (!; !)]

rLt  
F! (!; !) !




1  F (!; !) ^!;t

;
with the interest rate for those who default is given by:
rDt = d
B
t   ~sBt 1 +





^!;t 1 + qt +pCt + "
A
t : (B.9)
The labor supply schemes to the non-durable and durable sectors are:























t 1  pCt   "At





t 1  pCt   "At

  [1  F (!; !)]RL ~SB

F! (!; !) !




1  F (!; !) ^!;t 1

= ~SB~sBt + WL
B( ~wCt + l
B;C
t ) + (1  )WLB( ~wDt + lB;Dt ): (B.12)
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= (1  )DBG (!; !)






















F! (!; !) !




1  F (!; !) ^!;t

:







= rLt + ~s
B
t   EtpCt+1; (B.14)






t 1  pCt   "At : (B.15)
The evolution of domestic and imported non-durable consumption is:
cH;t = C(1  )tt + cTOTt ; (B.16)
cF;t =  Ctt + cTOTt ; (B.17)
where aggregate non-durable consumption is:
C + (1  )CB cTOTt = Cct + (1  )CBcBt : (B.18)











where total hours in each sector are given by:
LC + (1  )LB;C lC;TOTt = LC lCt + (1  )LB;C lB;Ct ; (B.21)
LD + (1  )LB;D lD;TOTt = LDlDt + (1  )LB;DlB;Dt : (B.22)
The CPI is given by:
pCt = pH;t + (1  )pF;t: (B.23)
The relative price of housing is:
qt = qt 1 +pDt  pCt ; (B.24)
and the pricing equations are given by:
pHt   'CpHt 1 = Et(pHt+1   'CpHt ) + C





where C = (1 C)(1 C)
C
, and
pDt   'DpDt 1 = Et(pDt+1   'DpDt ) + D

~wDt   qt   zDt

; (B.26)
where D = (1 D)(1 D)
D
.
The market clearing conditions for the non-durable goods sector reads as follows:
yCt = cH;t +
(1  n)(1   )
n
cH;t: (B.27)
Aggregate investment expenditures equal production of investment goods:
yDt =
Dit + (1  )DBiBt
D + (1  )DB ; (B.28)
and the law of motion of the two types of housing stocks are given by:
dt = (1  )dt 1 + it 1   "At ; (B.29)
dBt = (1  )dBt 1 + iBt 1   "At : (B.30)
Aggregated output is given by:
yt = y
C






Here, we present the conditions of the model for the foreign country. From the




ct   "(ct 1   "At )
1  " +  (i

t   it 1 + "At ) = Et%t+1 +  (Etit+1   it ); (B.32)
[1  (1  )] (Dt   dt ) = %t   (1  )Et%t+1; (B.33)
"(ct + "
A
t ) = Etc













ct   "(ct 1   "At )
1  " ; (B.35)
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ct   "(ct 1   "At )
1  " : (B.36)






t   "B(cBt 1   "At )




































 (1  "B)BRL [1  F (!; !)]

rLt  
F! (!; !) !







































































t 1  pCt   "At





t 1  pCt   "At

  [1  F (!; !)]RL ~SB

F! (!; !) !








= ~SB~sBt + W
LB( ~wCt + l
B;C
t ) + (1  )W LB( ~wDt + lB;Dt ): (B.43)











= (1  )DBG (!; !)
























F! (!; !) !
































t   "At : (B.46)





cF;t =  C(1   )tt + cTOT

t ; (B.48)
where aggregate non-durable consumption is:
C + (1  )CB cTOT t = Cct + (1  )CBcBt : (B.49)















where total hours in each sector are given by:
LC

+ (1  )LB;C lC;TOT t = LClCt + (1  )LB;ClB;Ct ; (B.52)
LD





t = (1   )pH;t +  pF;t: (B.54)








and the pricing equations are given by:























t ) + 













1  n cF;t: (B.58)
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Dit + (1  )DBiBt
D + (1  )DB ; (B.59)
and the law of motion of the two types of housing stocks are given by:
dt = (1  )dt 1 + it 1   "At ; (B.60)
dB





t 1   "At : (B.61)













Euro Area Variables and Other Equations
The relationship between the two nominal interest rates in the home and foreign
country is as follows:
rt = rt +  (bbt + #t) : (B.63)









  (1  )cF;t; (B.64)
where we have used the fact that tt =  tt , and the evolution of the terms of trade is
given by:
tt = tt 1 +pFt  pHt : (B.65)
The monetary policy Taylor rule conducted by the ECB reads:






yEMUt   yEMUt 1 + "At

+ "mt ; (B.66)
where the euro area CPI and output is given by:
pEMUt = np
C
t + (1  n)pC

t ; (B.67)
yEMUt = nyt + (1  n)yt : (B.68)
Finally, in Sections 4, when we include the macroprudential tools, we assume that
they are linear functions of an indicator variable (t and t ) which is either credit
growth or credit to GDP in each country:































































!;t = (1  !) ! + !!;t 1 + u!;t; (B.79)
!;t = (1  !) ! + !!;t 1 + u!;t; (B.80)
#t = ##t 1 + "
#
t ; (B.81)
while the non-stationary innovation to the union-wide technology shock and the




C Additional Estimation Results
Table C.1: Prior and Posterior Distributions, Shock Processes
Parameters Prior Posterior
AR(1) coe¢ cients Mean S.D. Mean 90% C.S.
Z;C Technology, non-durables Beta 0.7 0.1 0.79 [0.72,0.87]
Z;D Technology, durables Beta 0.7 0.1 0.86 [0.79,0.93]
;C Preference, non-durables Beta 0.7 0.1 0.66 [0.52,0.82]
;D Preference, durables Beta 0.7 0.1 0.98 [0.97,0.99]
! Risk shock, durables Beta 0.7 0.1 0.84 [0.80,0.88]
# Risk premium, core-periphery Beta 0.7 0.1 0.78 [0.67,0.90]
Std. Dev. Shocks (in percent)
A Technology, EMU-wide Gamma 0.7 0.2 0.83 [0.61,1.04]
CZ Tech., non-durables, core Gamma 0.7 0.2 0.62 [0.42,0.83]
C

Z Tech., non-durables, periphery Gamma 0.7 0.2 0.66 [0.40,0.90]
C;COMZ Tech., non-durables, common Gamma 0.7 0.2 0.74 [0.54,0.95]
DZ Tech., durables, core Gamma 0.7 0.2 1.62 [1.27,1.68]
D

Z Tech., durables, periphery Gamma 0.7 0.2 1.43 [1.10,1.74]
C Preference, non-durables, core Gamma 1 0.5 1.87 [1.35,2.41]
C

 Pref., non-durables, periphery Gamma 1 0.5 1.41 [0.90,1.95]
D Pref., durables, core Gamma 1 0.5 3.09 [2.19,3.97]
D

 Pref., durables, periphery Gamma 1 0.5 3.25 [2.39,4.06]
D;COM Pref., durables, common Gamma 1 0.5 1.46 [0.62,2.22]
m Monetary Gamma 0.4 0.2 0.12 [0.1,0.14]
# Risk premium, international Gamma 0.4 0.2 0.2 [0.1,0.3]
u!;t Risk shock, durables, core Gamma 25 12.5 11.79 [8.74,15.00]





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C.3: Posterior Variance Decomposition (90 percent condence set)
Shocks
r Common Nondurable Technology Core Nondurable Technology
[31.9, 60.2] [8.3, 27.3]
pC Common Nondurable Technology Core Nondurable Technology
[25.5, 51.1] [15.5, 40.9]
c Core Nondurable Preference EMU-wide Technology
[48.5, 71.6] [15.5, 36.7]
yD Core Durable Preference Core Durable Technology
[31.2, 60.3] [19.5, 40.0]
pD Core Durable Preference Core Durable Technology
[30.4, 54.7] [16.8, 29.5]
s Risk Core Core Durable Preference
[34.9, 59.8] [17.2, 41.7]
pC

Common Nondurable Technology Country Risk Premium
[19.2, 39.6] [13.8, 36.8]
c Periphery Nondurable Preference EMU-wide Technology
[23.1, 56.7] [21.0, 49.0]
yD

Periphery Durable Preference Periphery Durable Technology
[34.3, 58.2] [19.4, 33.3]
pD

Periphery Durable Preference Periphery Durable Technology
[31.5, 61.2] [13.4, 33.1]
s Risk Periphery Periphery Durable Preference
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